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Abstract 
For several decades, a new political prospective has emerged in the Political Science 
literature - Policy Feedback Theory. Put simply, Policy Feedback Theory looks at the way public 
policy affects politics. Existing policies can define the political environment, shaping the 
capacities, interests, and beliefs of political elites and states, which in tum influence the next 
round of policy-making. However, does public policy only change the politics of elites and 
states? Can public policy also change the politics of mass publics? Recent Political Science 
researchers are now examining this question. 
Even though much ground has been gained in examining this question, some outstanding 
problems still remain. Specifically, much of the research on policy feedbacks deals with targeted 
populations of the citizenry, e.g. the elderly, the poor, and veterans. Of grave importance to 
political scientists, and policy feedback researchers specifically, is the political participation of 
low-income Americans, particularly those afflicted with serious economic, personal, or health 
related hardships. Though Policy Feedback Theory can help explain much of how and why 
populations affected by policies engage politically and civically, it is important to consider other 
factors that can increase and decrease political participation. In addition to traditional Policy 
Feedback Theory, can other factors like serious economic, personal, or health related hardships 
help explain political participation, or the lack thereof, among targeted groups? 
In this paper, I will expand on the Political Science literature by examining this important 
question. Using data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, a national, 
longitudinal study that follows the lives of families on welfare and documents their hardships, 
welfare usage, and political activities, I will examine the political participation of low-income 
Americans who experience economic, personal, or health related hardships, as well as examining 
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their political beliefs and experiences to further shed light on how the poor participate politically 
in America. By also testing policy usage among the poor, I will also add to the policy feedback 
literature as well as the literature on political participation. I find that the three tested public 
policies do indeed influence political and civic participation, and that some hardships affect 
participation rates while others do not. 
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Chapter 1 :  Introduction 
Politics touches every part of our life - the social, the financial, and the personal. As the 
government is likely to remain active in the lives of its citizens, it is nearly impossible for 
someone to not have any governmental contact. With government activites growing over the 
decades into massive systems designed to extract, deploy, and distribute resources to and from its 
citizens, such extensive activity makes it highly likely that not only will the politics of the day 
influence present and future public policy-making, but that as political scientist E.E. 
Schattschneider noted in the 1 930s, "new policies will create new politics" (Pierson 1 993, 595). 
It is these existing policies, some of which have been in place for many decades, that can define 
and change the political environment, shaping the interests and beliefs of political elites and 
states, and as a result, change or alter the outcomes of the next round of policy-making 
(Campbell 20 1 2) .  Within Political Science, Policy Feedback Theory developed to explain such 
an idea. Thoughout its scholarly history, Policy Feedback Theory has garnered a significant 
foothold in the Political Science literature, helping to explain how political elites and political 
states are influenced by the existing policies of its government. Recently however, scholars have 
looked into how existing policies can influence mass publics, which can have dramatic 
consequences for policy outcomes. Because public policy is now being studied as a source of 
political acquisition, policy feedbacks have been added to the list of factors influencing behavior 
and attitudes among elites and the public (Campbell, 201 2). Bruch et al . (20 1 0) performed a 
study analyzing such questions on how existing policies might influence mass publics. 
Specifically, the authors looked into how experiences with public policies affect levels of civic 
and political engagement among the poor. To further the Political Science and policy feedback 
literature, Bruch et al . (20 1 0) looked into three outstanding questions related to the study of 
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policy feedbacks: selection bias, the distinction between universal and targeted programs, and the 
types of authority relations most likely to foster engagement among the poor. By using the 
Fragile Families and Child Well-being Study, the authors answered the three outstanding 
questions by showing how policies' effects are not an illusion created by selection bias; the 
effects of targeted programs can both promote and discourage engagement; and such effects tend 
to be more positive when a policy' s authority structure reflects democratic rather than paternalist 
principles. Using Bruch et al. (201 0) as a model, I will expand on the Political Science and 
policy feedback literature by examining how particular hardships - whether economic, personal, 
or health related - can affect political participation. Of importance is the way that hardships 
could act as "blocks" to political participation, even though Policy Feedback Theory would 
suggest that those who experience a particular policy should either be more likely to participate 
or less likely to participate. By examining questions related to how hardships can impact political 
participation, further evidence can show not only how policies affect mass publics' political 
participation, but how other factors can promote or hender political participation in the 
disadvantaged. To analyze such questions, I will use the Fragile Familes and Child Well-being 
Study. The Fragile Familes and Child Well-being Study, as Bruch et al . (20 1 0) have shown, is an 
excellent longitudinal study that follows low-income adults and their children and contains a 
myriad of variables that will allow for the measurement of political and civic engagement as well 
as economic, personal and health-related hardships. This study also contains additional 
demographic controls, allowing for a more robust analysis, and a wealth of data on public policy 
use among low-income adults, allowing for policy feedback studies. However, it must be noted 
that the Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study has a restricted age range - young parents 
of very young children - suggesting a need for caution when generalizing the findings to older 
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cohorts. In my study, I will look into low-income use of three public policies: Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Head Start (including Early Head Start), and public 
housing assistance. Also of importance is the data on Americans' own personal experiences with 
government programs and demographic variables that allow for the examination of the poor's 
political participation. By using this study, I will shed light on low-income Americans' political 
participation, particularly when many low-income Americans face severe economic, personal, 
and health related hardships. 
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Chapter 2 :  Background and Context 
Policy Feedback Effects 
What is Policy Feedback Theory? How do feedback effects affect mass publics? Put 
simply, Policy Feedback Theory looks at the way public policy affects politics. Existing policies 
can define the political environment, shaping the capacities, interests, and beliefs of political 
elites and states, which in tum influence the next round of policy-making. The key concept in 
Policy Feedback Theory is that policy feedbacks create a loop that both alters the policy 
environment and affects constituent behavior. A first notable trait of policy feedbacks is their 
dichotomous nature; that is, policy feedbacks have either negative or positive feedback effects. 
Positive feedback effects are those effects that increase the likelihood of an individual engaging 
politically or civicly. Conversly, negative feedback effects are those that decrease the likelihood 
of an individual engaging politically or civicly (Campbell 201 2). Each of these characteristics are 
essential to understanding how a policy affects a targeted groups of citizens. Aside from the 
basic dichotomy of policy deedback effects, scholars have also found two just as important 
characteristics that define feedback effects: resource and interpretive effects. The early claim 
among policy feedback researchers was that governmental programs, particularly welfare 
programs, create constituencies with an incentive to protect their benefits (Pierson 1 994 ). Further 
research on this claim showed various pathways through which policies could affect targeted 
constituencies: by affecting politically revelant resources, affecting attitudes toward political 
engagement, and affecting political mobilization (Campbell 201 2). Scholars (Campbell 2003 ; 
Mettler 2005) have shown that by providing targeted constituencies with politically revelant 
resources, the constituencies feel a need to give back to the community - what scholars have 
called the reciprocity effect. Based on the early claim made by Pierson ( 1 994), the reciprocity 
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(also known as the interpretive effect) was intially seen as being driven by self-interest - that is, 
the constituencies needed to protect their benefits and thus participated in society. However, 
further research shows that the reciprocity effect is not always based on self-interest. Thus, 
policy feedbacks can be positive or negative, by either providing or restricting a politically 
revelant resource and, if positive, can cause a reciprocity effect among its constituency. 
Using the framework provided above, scholars of policy feedback studies have looked 
into what types of policies would produce feedback effects. A first finding among feedback 
scholars was the possible differing feedback effects that universal programs have over targeted 
programs. Based on the findings, scholars (e.g. Skocpol 1 99 1 ,  Wilson 1 987) have extolled the 
virtues of universal programs over targeted ones, particularly because of the nonstigmatizing 
way that universal programs give out resources. Further evidence from studies on the policy 
feedback effects of Social Security and Medicare - being universal programs - compared to 
targeted, means-tested programs like AFDC/T ANF supports the claims of positive feedback 
effects of universal programs and negative feedback effects of targeted programs (Campbell 
201 2). However, further research by scholars of political behavior (e.g. Bruch et al . 201 0) have 
shown that it is possible for other factors to contribute to a targeted policies' negative feedback 
effects, and that targeted programs can also have positive feedback effects. Just as the type of 
program can affect political behavior, other factors can also foster policy feedbacks. One of the 
primary resource effects that policy feedback scholars have found through their studies is how a 
program goes about giving out their benefits .  When programs have a large benefit size it can 
have a measurable political effect on behavior. A recent example of such benefit size is Social 
Security (Campbell 2003). Conversely, if a programs benefit size is too small, it can decrease 
political participation (e.g. AFDC/TANF). However, programs can also have a null effect on 
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political participation. Scholars (Howard 2007; Patashnik & Zelizer 2007) expected to see 
positive feedback effects in some acts of Congress, but instead found null effects. Aside from 
size, benefit visibility, traceable, proximity, and duration can contribute to feedback effects. 
When a benefit is visible - the public is aware of what the benefits are - and traceable - the 
public can trace where the benefits come from, the program is more likely to increase 
participation. Benefit proximity - whether the beneficiaries geographically near each other - can 
have an effect by enabling greater interest group mobilization. A benefit' s  duration tends to have 
a powerful effect on feedback effects. Programs of long duration like Social Security and 
Medicare tend to produce greater mobilization. All of these factors - universal vs. targeted 
programs, benefit size, visibility, traceable, proximity, and duration - can produce noticable 
feedback effects that can either increase or decrease political participation. 
Political Participation Among the Poor 
According to the United States Census Bureau, roughly 1 6  percent or 50 million 
Americans live in or near poverty in 2012. This figure is up from 46 million Americans in 
poverty in 20 1 0  and 49.7 million in poverty in 20 1 1 . Even worse among the Census numbers, 
nearly 20 percent of American children live in poverty (CBS 201 2). Also among these high 
numbers, Americans and policy researchers are now comfortable with low-income Americans 
not participating in American politics. As research has shown, low-income Americans are less 
likely than middle or upper-income Americans to have the skills and resources that lead to 
political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1 995). Aside from the skills needed to lead 
a political life, low-income Americans typically do not belong to civic or political organizations 
that recruit people into politics (Radcliff and Davis 2000). One would also assume that possibly 
because low-income adults have access to governmental services, they would care about their 
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benefits and engage civicly and politically in activities like voting. However, the case is less 
straight forward as research has shown that even though low-income adults might have 
governmental contact, they still are less likely to engage civiclly and politically (Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1 995). Because low-income Americans are less likely to participate in 
political life, this poses a serious concern as individuals best represent their own interests, and 
even secondary organizations that have a broad interest in all citizens lives or a specific interest 
in the lives of the poor fail to conpensate for direct political participation (Lawless and Fox 
2001 ). Due to these low levels of political participation, the poor are less likely to be represented 
in government, and as a result can lead to legislation that may not be in the interest of the poor 
(e.g. 1 996 welform reform). The question remains, though, why do low-income Americans 
participate less civically and politically? 
Explanations for why low-income Americans are less likely to participate in American 
politics come in many different types. Conservative analysts typically see governmental 
assistance as a suppressor of personal motivation and a fosterer of dependency, all of which are 
traits that are not likely to lead to political participation (Mead 1 997). However, the most 
compelling argument made for why the poor do not engage politically comes from the landmark 
American Citizen Participation study done by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady ( 1 995). According 
to their explanation of why low-income Americans do not participate politically or civically, 
those Americans that live in poverty often do not have the resources (financial and otherwise), 
free time, skills, or level of motivation necessary to participate in political life or be recruited for 
political action. All political activities require time or money, or some combination of the two, 
and it is these very foundational requirements that many low-income Americans lack. Also, 
certain political activities such as contacting a public official or working on a campaign, require 
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"civic skills," many Americans can pick up in a non-political setting and then put to use in a 
political setting. However, according to Verba, Schlozman, and Brady ( 1 995), low-income 
Americans are so singificantly lacking these factors that they have just become a very inactive 
group. Ultimately, having or not having resources becaomes the focal point for which low­
income Americans choose to either participate or not to participate. 
Even though Verba, Schlozman, and Brady' s ( 1 995) explanation for why the poor fail to 
participate politically is the most popular among political scientists, scholars (Wilson 1 99 1 ;  
Cohen and Dawson 1 993 ; Massey and Kanaiaupuni 1 993 ; Massey, Gross, and Shibuya 1 994; 
Soss 1 999; and Lawless & Fox 200 1 )  have also added to the traditional lack of resources 
explanation by also providing empirical evidence for the role of political learning. According to 
these scholars, traditional demographic and economic variables are not the only necessary 
criteria needed to explain the lack of political mobilization among the poor. Specifically these 
scholars contend that the conditions of foster poverty create living environments of a distinctly 
harsh character; that is, these areas are in high concentrations of crime, violence, welfare 
dependency, family disruption, and educational failure. Accordingly, interaction with social 
workers (Soss 1 999) and police officers (Lawless and Fox 200 1 )  also lead to political earning 
that can have a measureable effect on political participation. All of these factors - demographic 
and economic variables and the lack thereof to political learning situations - provide ways for 
low-income Americans to participate politically in society, and typically, produce a situation that 
leads to less political activity. 
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Chapter 3 :  Literature Review 
The literature on policy feedbacks and political participation among Americans has come 
a long way from its beginnings. Not only has the research on policy feedbacks and political 
participation been validated by study after study, it also provides a myriad of data for politicians 
and policy experts that allows for real world applications of the research. Much of the previous 
research on policy feedback effects and political participation is useful to understanding how 
economic, personal, and health-related hardships can impact political and civic participation 
among low-income Americans. The existing literature provides a foundation for my research on 
political participation among the impoverished by providing insight on the theoretical 
foundations of policy feedback effects, case studies of policies and their policy feedback effects, 
political participation, and the model study for my paper. 
The Theoretical Foundations of Policy Feedback Effects 
The place to begin the literature review is with Paul Pierson's ( 1 993) When Effect 
Becomes Cause. In this foundational work, Pierson ( 1 993) laid out mechanisms for how policy 
feedbacks can have "resource" and "interpretive" effects that guide how an individual reacts to a 
policy. According to Pierson ( 1 993), policies extract, deploy, and distribute resources to and 
from targeted segments of the population. By giving or taking away resources, this lead to an 
interpretive effect. Essentially, the individuals who are affected by the resource allocation or 
extraction will react to the policy. This interpretive effect, Pierson argues, guides much of policy 
feedback studies. Ever since Pierson ( 1 993), his hypotheses on resource and interpretive effects 
have guided much of the later research. Also key to the early foundational work of policy 
feedback effects is the work by Schneider and Ingram ( 1 993). Schneider and Ingram ( 1 993) 
contend that central to policy feedback studies is the Social Construction Theory. This theory 
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contends that social constructions influence the policy agenda and the selection of policy tools, 
as well as the rationales that legitimate policy choices (Schneider and Ingram 1 993 ). As such, 
Schneider and Ingram ( 1 993) find that the designs of public polices can generate the social 
construction of targeted populations, which is defined as "the cultural characterizations or 
popular images of the persons or groups whose behavior and well-being are affected by public 
policy" (334). These characterizations can then influence the next round of policy making by 
influencing the behavior of government officals toward these targeted groups. In part, Schneider 
and Ingram ( 1 993) were reacting to the culture of poverty literature - which asserted that the 
poor have a value system that undermines their ability to move up financially - that the authors 
felt did not adequately fit the whole picture. Instead, Schneider and Ingram ( 1 993) found that 
group characteristics are shaped by public policy itself. Using these basic theoretical foundations, 
Kristin Goss (201 0) expanded on Policy Feedback Theory by providing a multi-level theory of 
policy feedbacks. Goss ' s  (201 0) multi-level theory of policy feedbacks expands on the 
traditional policy feedback model in several ways. Accroding to Goss (201 0), policy feedback 
models tend to focus on two areas of engagement: organizational (e.g. interest group lobbying) 
and individual (joining associations), with each form of political engagement treated as a 
separate, discrete form of political phenomenon. Goss (201 0) however, lays out a theoretical 
framework for the integration of these two key phenomenas. The author suggests that laws and 
administrative rules operate on voluntary organizations to structure the resources, capacities, 
strategies, and ideals of individuals (Goss 201 0). In the work, Goss (20 1 0) argues that public 
policy structures the political orientation of society by stimulating certain groups and 
constraining others, and sebsequently altering the resources and political learning of mass 
publics. Goss ' s  (20 1 0) work is the most recent theoretical work on policy feedbacks. 
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Policy Feedback Case Studies 
Soss ( 1 999) examined the links between welfare participation and broader forms of 
political involvement. Using a political learning perspective, Soss ( 1 999) found that policy 
designs could structure a client' s experiences about that program in ways that can teach 
alternative lessons about the nature of government. Specifically, Soss ( 1 999) points out that 
through an individual' s  experiences under a certain policy design can create program-specific 
beliefs about the wisdom and efficacy of asserting themselves. The author focused on welfare 
policy and found that clients of welfare programs interpret their experiences with the respective 
bureaucracies as evidence of how government works generally, and thus their beliefs about the 
welfare agency and client involvement become the basis for broader political beliefs. He 
concludes that the views that citizens develop about governmental programs through 
participation in those programs can explain broader patterns of political actions and quiescence 
(Soss 1 999). 
In 2007, Joe Soss again tackled policy feedback effects of a specific public policy: 
welfare reform. Soss and Schram (2007) looked into how welfare reform could have influenced 
the opinions of mass publics not receiving welfare. Soss and Schram (2007) points out that 
"progressive revisionists" of the 1 990's argued that, by reforming welfare, liberals could free the 
Democratic Party of a significant electoral liability, reduce the race-coding of poverty politics, 
and produce a public more willing to invest in anti-poverty efforts. The author found that welfare 
reform did not produce measureable, positive changes in mass opinion on welfare (Soss and 
Schram 2007). The author contends that the 1 996 welfare reform bill did not produce positive 
policy feedback among the mass public, as progressive revisionists had hoped. Just like Soss and 
Schram's (2007) analysis of policy feedback effects among mass publics, Mettler and Stonecash 
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(2008) continue to expand on this area of policy feedbacks cumulative program usage among 
individuals or how it may influence their political attitudes or behavior. The authors found that 
direct experience of social programs is fairly common and widespread across the population, but 
the beneficiaries of social programs have differing assessments of the programs compared to 
non-beneficiaries (Mettler and Stonecash 2008). After controlling for demographic factors, the 
authors find that the greater the number of universal programs citizens have used, the greater the 
likelihood that they vote, and conversely, the greater the number of means-tested programs they 
have used, the lower their likelihood of voting. They contend that experiences of social programs 
may influence voter turnout and may help explain why young and less advantaged citizens vote 
less than older citizens. 
Just as policies can create feedbacks, there are limitations to what a policy can do. 
Specifically, policies can produce weak or no policy feedback effects at all. Patashnik and 
Zelizer (20 I 0) looked into how policies may not produce feedback effects. The authors found 
three common reasons why feedback effects, or at least positive ones, might not arise after a law 
is enacted: weak policy design, inadequate or conflicting institutional supports, and poor timing 
(Patashnik and Zelizer 201 0). They contend that these conditions may be an unintended 
byproduct of the lawmaking process or they may stem from deliberate attempts by opponents to 
prevent a new policy from durably reshaping governing possibilities for the future. When it 
comes to weak policy design, the authors find three ways that policy design can inhibit 
feedbacks. The primary and most important way is policy designs may simply not provide 
enough material resources to facilitate an interpretive effect among a constituency to defend the 
policy. A second way that the authors note is informational; that is, when there are problems with 
the law, key segments of the public are unable to perceive what a policy does for them, and thus 
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no support for the law is given. A final way shown by Patashnik and Zelizer (20 1 0) is when 
benefits are distributed too slowly or too broadly. This can weaken the building of a strong 
constituency and doom the possibility for feedback effects. The second primary problem that can 
inhibit feedback effects is conflicting or inadequate institutional supports. In the simplest terms, 
when institutions within government are not equally conducive in promoting positive 
reinforcement of a bill, feedback effects can fail to tum up. The final problem noted by Patashnik 
and Zelizer (20 1 0) is that of poor timing. When legislation is passed during perceived 
inauspicious times, this can leave a permanent lack of feedback effects among the public. All of 
these factors, as Patashnik and Zelizer (201 0) have shown, can inhibit the development of 
feedback effects. 
Not all policy feedback studies are confined to American politics. Ewig and Kay (20 1 1 )  
looked into policy feedback effects o f  Chile' s  health and pension reforms. Through a 
comparison of three periods of health and pension reform in Chile, the authors develop a policy 
feedback reasoning as to why mediated, slow social change took place in place where the rise of 
leftist governments should show more pronounced social change. The authors describe "post­
retrenchment politics," which constitutes realignment in the way politics plays out in countries 
that have undergone social policy retrenchment where the strengthened position of private 
business interests, combined with political learning legacies and lock-in effects generated by 
reforms, results in incremental political change, despite renewed efforts by left parties to address 
inequality (Ewig and Kay 201 1 ) .  Following Ewig and Kay's (20 1 1 )  example, Jordan (201 3) 
looked into policy feedbacks and welfare support in 1 7  advanced countries. Jordan (201 3) 
predicts that highly inclusive welfare institutions will generate larger bases of public support by 
shifting the focus away from redistribution and toward common market insecurities felt across 
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classes, while more selective strategies erode support by highlighting the conflicts of interest 
imbedded in clearly redistributive social programs. After controlling for both individual and 
cross-national factors, the analysis by Jordan (20 1 3) suggests that universal programs build 
larger bases of support for the welfare state than more targeted strategies. Such evidence from 
Ewig and Kay (20 1 1 )  and Jordan (2013 )  show that policy feedback effects are not just American 
political phenomena, but can occur in a variety of political settings. 
Political Participation 
Political and civic participation may be one of the most important aspects of being a 
citizen in any country. As such, the study of political participation is as important to Political 
Science as it is to larger society. The place to begin a review of political participation is with the 
landmark study by Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie ( 1 993) on political participation in the 
U.S. Using responses to a large-scale national survey designed to sample political activists, the 
authors investigate the extent to which active participants are representative of the population as 
a whole. The authors' analysis shows that although their preferences may be similar as measured 
by standard NES attitude questions, citizens who are active and those who are not are quite 
different in their demographic attributes, their economic needs, and the government benefits they 
receive (Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie 1 993). These disparities are exacerbated when the 
authors move away from the most common political act, voting, to acts that are more difficult, 
convey more information, and exert greater pressure. For example, with respect to the volume of 
activity, the disparity is especially great for electoral contributions where the advantaged account 
for the overwhelming share of the dollars donated to campaigns. When we examined the issues 
that foster political participation, the authors found that while all groups bring diverse concerns 
to their activity, the particular mixture differs substantially among groups. Issues that concern the 
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economically disadvantaged are usually about basic human needs, and they speak with a 
distinctive voice. Not only do such issues weigh more heavily in their lists of concerns, but when 
they communicate about these matters to public officials, they are more likely to be discussing 
issues that touch their own lives and more likely to be prescribing greater public attention to 
these needs (Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie 1 993). This study provides the first such study 
of political participation among advantaged and disadvantaged groups of Americans. 
For much of the literature, social scientists have concerned themselves with how race, 
geographic area, and government restrictions influence political participation. Bobo and Gilliam 
( 1 990) looked into the issue of race and political participation. Using a national survey sample 
oversampled with African Americans, the authors examined black and white American 
differences in sociopolitical participation. They hypothesized that increases in black 
empowerment would affect the level of black sociopolitical participation and change the nature 
of black and white American differences in political behavior. The results show that blacks in 
high-black-empowerment areas - as indicated by control of the mayor's office - are more active 
than either blacks living in low-empowerment areas or their white counterparts of comparable 
socioeconomic status (Bobo and Gilliam 1 990). Furthermore, the results show that 
empowerment influences black participation by contributing to a more trusting and efficacious 
orientation to politics and by greatly increasing black attentiveness to political affairs. Cohen and 
Dawson ( 1 993) presented a study looking into whether neighborhoods - particularly African 
American neighborhoods - that are devastated with poverty and stricken with social isolationism 
can foster political isolationism. Using a 1 989 Detroit Area study, the authors found several 
results that add to the literature of race and political participation. Their results suggest that there 
are, indeed, significant differences between persistently poor neighborhoods and other less 
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impoverished neighborhoods. They found evidence that African Americans living in the most 
impoverished neighborhoods held different political attitudes and exhibited different political 
behavior, apart from the impact of individual poverty. The researchers also confirmed the 
hypothesis that social isolationism can foster political isolationism. Further, there exists an 
identifiable impact of neighborhood poverty on perceptions of the effectiveness of political acts, 
community efficacy, and group influence, with residents of the poorest neighborhoods 
demonstrating the most consistent effect. Ironically, the results of the study also suggest that 
African Americans who live in the poorest neighborhoods are more likely to believe in the 
efficacy of some types of political action even though they are less likely to engage in such 
actions. Leighly and Vedlitz ( 1 999) applied political participation models to assess their 
accuracy in predicting participation rates among White Americans, African Americans, Mexican 
Americans, and Asian Americans. The authors concluded that three of the models - the 
socioeconomic status model, the psychological resource model, and the social connectedness 
model - are the strongest in explaining overall participation across each of the four racial groups 
(Leighly and Vedlitz 1 999). However, the final two models - the group consciousness model and 
the group conflict model - fail to support predictors across all four racial groups. Their work is 
essential to the political participation literature as it was the first to test specific models of 
political participation across ethnic groups. 
Leaving the variable of race behind, Lawless and Fox (2001 )  looked into political 
participation among the urban poor. The authors investigated variations in economic hardship, 
political attitudes, and interactions with government agents of a sample of 462 low-income men 
and women in one of the poorest congressional districts in the country. By working from their 
own theoretical perspective of how urban poverty affects the willingness to participate in the 
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political system, the authors found important differences in factors that affected political 
behavior among citizens living in poverty. Their research reveals two key findings relating to 
political participation: first, material resources and the demographic attributes usually associated 
with a propensity to participate politically fostered political activism even among urban poor; 
and second, and more importantly, severe economic hardship, as well as formative contact with 
government agents whom citizens living in urban poverty routinely face, served as significant 
experiences that bolstered the willingness to participate in the political system (Lawless and Fox 
(200 1 ) . Ultimately, the authors conclude that the decision to participate in the political system 
cannot be separated from the very specific manner in which citizens encounter government. Tam 
Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck (2006) looked into neighborhood and social context and their influence 
on the decision to vote. They find that neighborhood context does have a socializing influence 
on voters, sometimes mobilizing them while at other times demobilizing them. Notably, this 
effect is separate from the effect of individual-level socio-demographic influences on 
participation. They also found that geographic patterns matter, primarily because of its influence 
over information flow. They conclude that a threshold effect exists where the more compacted 
and numerous ethnic groups are in a given geographic area, the more likely they are to vote. 
Lastly, A very and Peffley (2005) looked into government restrictions and how that factors into 
political participation. The authors note that the l 990 's  saw some of the most dramatic changes 
in the American social welfare system at both the national and state levels. In particular, states 
were granted, and took advantage of, much wider latitude in deciding that is eligible to receive 
welfare benefits. The authors wanted to know if the composition of a state's  electorate 
influenced that state' s restrictiveness of the welfare eligibility requirements. They found that in 
states where lower-class voter turnout was comparable to that of the upper class, lawmakers were 
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less likely to pass restrictive welfare eligibility rules. However, electorates in states with 
restrictive voter registration laws are much more likely to be biased toward upper-class turnout. 
Thus, they conclude that lower-class voter mobilization can affect the ability of the 
disadvantaged to achieve policies consistent with their interests, but state voter registration laws 
pose a substantial barrier to such mobilization. 
Model Study 
The principle inspiration and basis for my paper comes from the work done by Bruch et 
al. (20 1 0). The authors investigated how experiences with public policies affect levels of civic 
and political engagement among the poor. Among the questions the authors looked into was 
whether or not certain policy designs and universal vs. targeted programs are more likely to 
promote political participation among the poor. The authors point out that most studies reporting 
positive feedback effects focus on universal policies serving broad constituencies, such as the 
G.I. Bill (Mettler 2005) and Social Security (Campbell 2003) .  By contrast, the most negative 
feedback effects are associated with programs targeted to the poor, such as AFDC (Mettler and 
Stonecash 2008; Soss 2000). Thus research tends to promote the benefits of universal programs 
over targeted programs (Campbell 2007; Skocpol 1 991  ) .  As Nelson ( 1 990) analyzes, social 
welfare policies can be split roughly into two areas, social insurance programs on top and 
targeted public assistance programs on the bottom. So for Bruch et al . (201 0), the question of 
whether social policy designs must be universal to have positive feedback effects on political 
behavior still remains. As to their other question, the authors illustrate two areas of argument 
suggesting that means-tested programs can advance civic and political incorporation. However, 
these arguments rest on the types of authority structures that should produce positive effects. 
New patemalists, such as Mead ( 1 986, 2005), argue that social disorder and weak self-discipline 
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leave the welfare poor unable to shoulder the burdens of civic obligations (Bruch et al. 20 1 0). 
Civic and political incorporation are thus ill-served by "permissive" rights-oriented welfare 
programs and are better served by programs that impose order on recipients' lives and enforce 
civic obligations through directive and supervisory methods (Mead 1 986, 2005; Bruch et al. 
201 0). Other scholars (Schneider and Ingram 1 997; Soss 2000) argue that policies tend to 
promote engaged citizenship when they reject paternalist authority relations and position 
recipients as secure and equal citizens engaged in participatory processes. These scholars 
continue to argue that policy designs serve democracy best when their authority structures reflect 
democratic principles and convey the value of engagement (Bruch et al . 201 0). The authors find 
that targeted programs can in fact promote political participation. In this work, the authors find 
that Head Start and Public Housing Assistance produced a positive and null feedback effect 
respectively. This is in contrast with the pervious research on the benefits of universal porgrams 
and the failings of targeted programs. The finding also lend more credit to the idea that positive 
feedback effects tend to be more positive when a policy's authority structure reflects democratic 
rather than paternalist principles, countering the ideas of the New Paternalists such as Mead 
( 1 986, 2005). Drawing on such findings, Bruch et al. lay out a framework for how to preceed to 
in studing political participation among the poor. Specifically, how to go about looking into how 
policies can influence political participation, even in the face of serious hardships. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
This study is based on previously published work by Bruch et al. (201 0) .  They used the 
Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study to produce a convincing argument for the role that 
public policies play in influencing the civic and political participation of the poor. They used 
regression analysis to demonstrate how three different public policies play a significant role in 
the poor' s participation in politics. This paper will attempt to create a similar argument for how 
public policies affect the civic and political participation of the poor while dealing with 
significant economic, personal, and health related hardships. Bruch et al.' s (201 0) study 
contained some variables that measured hardships, but I will further the research by not just 
examining economic hardships, but also personal and health related. 
Bruch et al . (201 0) used various analytic strategies, such as binary logistic regression, to 
measure how a particular policy affects participation. This paper will attempt to replicate some 
of those strategies. However, every effort was taken to add to the literature by not only 
examining how policies affect participation, but also how hardships influence civic and political 
participation. While Bruch et al. ' s  (201 0) work is the inspiration, it was important to add to the 
Political Science literature. 
The first step was to find an appropriate data set to study political participation among the 
poor. The data set would have to include not only variables on participation in a number of 
political and civic activities, but also variables measuring economic, personal and health related 
hardships. Since Bruch et al (20 1 0) used the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, I 
started by looking into this data set. Upon further examination, I found the Frangile Familes data 
set to be well suited for my research. The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study provides 
longitudinal datasets that follows cohorts of parents and their newborn children in 20 U.S.  cities 
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with populations over 200,000 (Reichman et al. 200 1 ). The study intentially chose cities to 
provide variation in labor markets and welfare policy usage. The Fragile Families sampling 
strategy was designed to achieve a nationally representative sample of non-marital births in large 
U.S .  cities; the sample also includes a subsample of births to married parents. Between February 
1 998 and September 2000, births were sampled from hospitals in the selected cities, and baseline 
interviews were conducted with mothers and fathers. Mothers and fathers of the child were re­
interviewed when the child was 1 2  to 1 8  months (Year One Follow-up) and 3 years old (Year 
Three Follow-up). The data include measures of participation in a variety of public assistance 
programs and civic and political activities. In addition to providing a large sample of 
disadvantaged persons, the data includes a rich collection of items describing individuals' 
backgrounds and life conditions, such as measures of domestic violence experiences, substance 
abuse histories, mental health status as well as economic, personal, and health related hardships. 
These measures make the Fragile Familes data ideal for exploring citizen political and civic 
engagement in a population known to have low participation rates and a variety ofhard-to­
measure life conditions that might suppress participation. 
The Fragile Families Baseline sample consists of 4,898 families, including 3,7 1 2  
unmarried couples and 1 ,  1 86 married couples. Over the three interview periods (Baseline and 
Years One and Three Follow-ups), 86 percent of fathers were interviewed at least once, and 82 
percent of mothers were interviewed at all three waves. The overall response rate for the Year 
Three Follow-up was 77 percent (86 percent for mothers and 67 percent for fathers). I restricted 
the analysis sample to the 82 percent of mothers who were interviewed in the Year Three 
Followup, equaling a total of 303 1 respondents. This restriction was to better ascertain how 
health and personal hardships impact participation as mothers in the study were asked questions 
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relating such hardships and the fathers were not. It must be noted that the Fragile Families 
sample is not representative of the United States. Rather, it draws its sample only from large 
metropolitan areas and the study over-samples unmarried births; as a result, the sample is 
younger and more highly disadvantaged than the general population. Within these features, 
however, the sample should represent the inclination for political or civic participation among 
low-income users of public policies who deal with hardships.  
My analysis will be based on three outcome measures: voting, political participation, and 
civic participation. Voting indicates whether a respondent reported voting in the November 2000 
election. This variable is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for voting in the 2000 November 
election and 0 for not voting in the 2000 November election. Political participation indicates that 
the repondent has participated in a political demostration in the past year. This variable is a 
dichotomous variable coded 1 for participating in a political demstration and 0 for not 
participating in a political demostration. Civic participation indicates a repondent has 
participated in a community organization within the past year, and is also a dichotomous variable 
coded 1 for participating in a community organization and 0 for not participating in a community 
organization. The separation between political and civic participation was assessed by whether 
the type of participation is overty political.  So, for the political participation variable, being 
active in a demostration is an overt type of political participation. On the other hand, being 
involved in a community organization - while not absent of local politics - is not overtly 
political or partisan in its nature. 
The independent variables include several demographic and control predictors : whether a 
respondent' s  mother and father graduated from college, marital status, and poverty. For the 
respondent' s  parents having graduated from college, two variables were created. One of the 
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variables indicated whether a respondent' s mother had graduated college and is coded 1 if the 
respondent' s  mother graduated college and 0 if the respondent' s mother did not graduate college. 
The final parental education variable indicated whether or not the respondent's  father graduated 
college and was coded 1 if the father did graduate college and 0 if not. The variable marital 
status was included as a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the mother was married at the time of 
interview and 0 if not. The final demographic variable indicates whether or not the respondent at 
the time of interview is above the federal poverty line or below it. To ascertain this, I made a 
variable that was coded 1 if the respondent was above the poverty line at the time of interview 
and 0 if the respondent was not in poverty at the time of interview. 
A second set of measures indicates receipt of public aid. The first public aid program was 
the Temporary Aid for Needy Families program. The variable for this measure was set up to ask 
whether or not the respondent had ever received TANF aid and was coded dichotomously with 1 
as having received aid and 0 as not. The second public aid variable measured whether or not the 
respondent lives in a public housing project. This variable is coded 1 for yes and 0 for no. The 
final public aid variable measures whether or not the respondent had a child in Head Start in the 
child's lifetime. Likewise, this variable is coded 1 for having a child in head start and 0 for not 
having a child in head start. 
The third and final set of measures examined economic, personal, and health related 
hardships. I will break the three hardship categories into sections, starting with the economic 
hardships. In the economic hardship category, there are four variables that measure differing 
degrees of economic hardship. The first variable measures whether or not the respondent can 
count on having a secure place to live. This variable is primarily economic as it measures 
whether or not the respondent has affordable housing and can rely on their economic situation to 
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provide them with secure housing. The second economic variable measures whether or not the 
respondent has the means to provide emergency child care. Again, this variable measures the 
respondent' s ability to respond to an emergency with their child, which is directly related to the 
economic situation of the respondent. The third variable is the primary economic measure as it 
measures whether or not the respondent has a job or not. This variable is of importance as it 
measures a key economic characteristic. The final economic variable measures whether or not 
the respondent owns a vehicle. This variable is also of key importance as it can be inferred that a 
lack of a vehicle will hinder one's ability to participate politically and civicly. All of these 
variables are coded dichotomously with 1 being an affirmative response and 0 being the 
opposite. 
In the personal hardship category, there are four variables that measure differing personal 
hardships. The first personal hardship variable looks at whether or not the respondent has had a 
past conviction. The definition of conviction is not limited to being in jail, but also to any minor 
conviction such as traffic violations. The second variable measures a family aspect of the 
respondent. This variable asks whether the respondent's  curent partner - this could be a husband, 
boyfriend, or girlfriend - has a drug or alcohol problem that creates problems with their job, 
family, or friends. The final two variables measure the relationship between the mother and their 
current partner. The first one of this variables measures whether the mother has a good or bad 
relationship with the partner. The final variable measures abuse. The question asks whether the 
respondent has ever been hit by the father or current partner. All of the personal hardship 
variables are coded dichotomously with 1 as being an affirmative answer and 0 being not. 
The final hardship category examines health related problems. These include seven 
variables that measure different health problems of different members of the family. The first 
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variable meaures whether the current partner of the mother has a condition that limits their 
ability to work. This is the only variable that measures the health of the mother's partner. The 
next five variables measure the health of the motehr. The first one of these variables measures 
the mother's health. This is reported by the mother as either good or bad. The next variable 
measures whether the mother has a condition that limits the mother's ability to work. This 
variable is followed by another that measures whether the mother takes medication for some 
disease. These diseases included, but are not limited to: diabetes, high blood pressure, cardiac 
disease, etc. The next variable measures whether the mother reports being depressed for more 
than two weeks before. The final variable measuring the mother's  health and asks whether the 
mother has a history of drug abuse. The final health hardship variable measures the health of the 
child. This is reported by whether the child has some condition that is in need of medication. All 
of these variables have been coded dichotomously with a 1 being an affirmative answer and 0 
being not. 
The actual analysis for this paper is done with a binary logit regression, which was 
chosen for a couple of reasons. First, the inspiration for this study used a similar method to 
analyze public policies and their effect on participation (Bruch et al . 201 0). However, because of 
this paper is using different variables there are some differences. Bruch et al. (20 1 0) only briefly 
described the coding that was used in their study for the independent variables. As a result, most 
of the coding procedures were developed just for this paper. Because, the ultimate goal to 
explain whether economic, personal, and health related hardships are a useful predictor of voting, 
political participation, and civic participation is somewhat the same as Bruch et al . (20 1 0), there 
are similar, but not identical procedures used. Lo git regression was also selected because of the 
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dichotomous nature of the dependent variables. The results of the regression are available in 
Table 1 .  
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Chapter 5 :  Hypotheses 
The intent of this paper is to discover the role of hardships in political and civic 
participation oflow-income Americans. While some of the low participation rates among low 
income Americans have been attributed to sociological arguments (Marshall 1 964; Piven and 
Cloward [ 1 97 1 ]  1 993), new scholars (e.g. Pierson 1 993; Svallfors 2007) have fought hard to 
support the claim that policies are not just political outcomes, but are also factors that set 
political forces in motion and shape political motivation in the citizenry. Running a regression 
analysis that does not include variables relating to hardships - especially health and personal 
hardships, instead only including the policy measurements will show a degree of prediction as 
can be seen in Bruch et al. (20 1 0). If the policy measurements remain significant after the 
inclusion of hardship variables such as mother's  health, child's health, and demographic 
characteristics then, it can be argued, with a higher degree of certainty that the policies played a 
role in the decision to participate politically and civically. (Hyp.1) it is expected that the policy 
variables will be a significant predictor of political and civic participation, in line with previous 
research. Because previous research argues that policies affect participation, it is also expected 
that once the equation is controlled using demographic and hardship variables the policies will 
remain significant. 
Because certain policies are designed differently from each other, then it can be argued 
that certain polices will either decrease or increase participation rates among the poor. Major 
research has identified several types of policy structures that could hinder or increase 
participation rates: paternalistic, bureaucratic, and incorporating designs. In my analysis, each of 
the three types of public policies is matched with one of the three types of policy designs. 
Head Start - a national program that seeks to advance the social and cognitive 
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development of low-income children from birth to age five and provides educational, health, 
nutritional, and social services to low-income children - Head Star includes a significant parental 
involvement component. The emphasis on parental participation in local site councils and 
parental involvement in local programs makes Head Start an incorporating policy design. 
Temporary Aid for Needy Families TANF - a means-tested program for families with children ­
has a very different policy model. The program was remade in 1 996 to emphasize work 
requirements, time-limited aid, and a more directive and supervisory orientation toward clients 
(Mead 2004; Weaver 2000). Client experiences in this program are structured to focus on 
relationships with caseworkers that hold substantial power to define obligations and distribute 
benefits, services, and punishments (Schram et al. 2009; Soss 2000). Because of these reasons, 
T ANF exemplifies a paternalistic policy model. The final program is public housing. While 
public housing policy is complex, there is formal bureaucratic oversight provided by the federal 
government. Interactions between officials and recipients of public housing are more limited 
than in the other programs, emphasizing neither participation nor supervisory power (Bruch et al. 
2 0 1 0) .  As such, public housing is characterized as a bureaucratic policy model. The following 
hypothesis relates to these different policy models. (Hyp. 2) T ANF and public housing will 
decrease political and civic participation rates among low-income Americans while Head Start 
will increase civic participation rates. Again, this hypothesis is based on previous research 
(Bruch et al. 20 1 0). 
Hardships - whether economic, personal or health related - can have profound effects on 
an individual' s  life. There is evidence that participating in civic activities, such as working with 
community groups, is related to positive health outcomes (Weitzman and Kawachi 2000). While 
studies have examined health outcomes from social and economic situations, there are relatively 
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none that examine policy outcomes from certain situations. For example, economic inequality 
has been increasing in nearly all of the advanced industrial democracies over the past two 
decades (Smeeding 2005). The consequences of this economic inequality for the politics of these 
countries, however, have gone almost completely unexamined in the literature. As the APSA 
Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy from 2004 concluded, "we know little about 
the connections between changing economic inequality and changes in political behavior" (66 1 ). 
Given this situation, the following hypothesis was developed to ascertain the effect of economic 
hardships on political and civic participation. (Hyp. 3) Economic hardships will have a negative 
effect on the political and civic participation of low-income Americans while the absence of 
hardships will be associated with greater participation rates. For this hypothesis, the four 
variables associated with economic hardships are all expected to produce greater participation 
rates among low-income Americans. For example, the variable measuring whether the 
respondent has a job or not is expected to be positively associated with participation rates as the 
variable has been coded 1 for having a job. All the economic variables - as well as the health and 
personal hardships - have been coded to easily interpret the results. 
Measures of health and personal hardships are much rarer to find in the Political Science 
literature. As such, the hypotheses for these hardships are relatively new. (Hyp. 4) personal 
hardships are expected to be negatively associated with political and civic participation rates 
among low-income Americans. For this hypothesis and unlike the economic hardships, the 
variables for personal hardships are coded as to indicate whether the respondent has the hardship 
(as opposed to the economic hardships which were coded to indicate a lack of the hardships). So 
for example, if a respondent reports having a conviction record, it would be expected that the 
results would show a negative association with political and civic participation. The only 
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discrepancy is the relationship status variable, which is coded 1 to indicate a good relationship 
and 0 otherwise. (Hyp. 5) health related hardships are expected to be negatively associated with 
political and civic participation rates among low-income Americans. For this hypothesis and like 
the previous hardship measures, the variables for health related hardships are coded as to indicate 
whether the respondent has the hardship. For example, if a respondent reports having a health 
condition that limits his or her work ability or takes medication for some disease, it would be 
expected that the results would show a negative association with political and civic participation. 
Similar to Bruch et al. ' s  (201 0) study, binary logit regression analysis will be used to test 
the hypotheses. The hope is that the data will indicate that public policies differing in policy 
designs will affect political and civic participation in different rates, and that economic, personal, 
and health related hardships will hinder participation. The more variables that are found to 
maintain their significance, the easier it will be to claim a link between policies and hardships. 
Furthering the scope of this study, a confirmation of hypotheses three through five will show that 
not only do policies matter in participation rates, but also that hardships can be used as a useful 
predictor. Also, a confirming result for hypotheses one through two will confirm previous 
research on the topic of policy feedback effects. 
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Chapter 6: Analysis 
Public policies can have an effect on the participation rates among those the policies 
affect (Bruch et al. 20 10) .  Given that certain polices have different policy models, it would be 
expected that po lei es with differing models would affect participation rates at differing rates. 
Table 1 presents the participation rates for respondents participating in T ANF, public housing, 
and Head Start programs as well as for the full dample. Those individuals in the study that relied 
on public assistance in the form of TANF, public housing, and head start were less likely to vote 
then the full sample. For TANF, roughly 38 .7  percent of the sample voted in the 2000 
November election. For public housing, 41 .6 percent of the respondents who received public 
housing assistance reported voting in the 2000 November election. Finally, 48.4 percent of the 
respondents who received Head Start assistance reported voting in the 2000 November election. 
The full sample, compared to the three public assistance programs, shows a greater precentage 
(64%) of respondents that reported voting in the 2000 November election. 
Political participation rates among the low-income Americans that reported using the 
public assistance programs also were lower when compared to the full sample. However, there 
are some differences that deserve attention. For the full sample, roughly 7.5 percent of the 
repondents reported participation in a political demostration. Public housing and Head Start users 
also participated in rates that would be expected. For public housing assistance, 4.2 percent of 
the respondents reported participating in a political demostration, while 6.5 percent of the 
respondents that reported using Head Start reported participating in a political demostration. 
However, respondents that reported using T ANF had a higher reported political participation rate 
than the other two public assistance programs as well as the full sample. Roughly 1 0. 7 percent of 
those respondents reported participating in a political demostration. This higher rate when 
39 
compared to the full sample and the two other programs, which were expected to be higher than 
T ANF, may be because of the higher reported number of respondents that receive T ANF 
compared to those that do not receive any aid. The Fragile Families Study was meant to examine 
those low-income Americans that participate in assistance programs and as such, more the study 
sought out more respondents that belonged to public aid programs. To fully understand the effect 
that T ANF has on political and civic participation, a regression analysis was needed and will be 
dicussed later. 
Finally, civic participation rates among the low-income Americans that reported using the 
three public assistance programs also were lower when compared to the full sample. For TANF, 
roughly 4.2 percent of the sample reported participating in a local community organization. For 
public housing, 1 1  percent of the respondents who received public housing assistance reported 
participating in a local community organization. Finally, 1 7  . 1  percent of the respondents who 
received Head Start assistance reported participating in a local community organization. The full 
sample, compared to two public assistance programs - T ANF and public housing, shows a 
greater precentage ( 1 6 .3 % ) of respondents that reported participating in a local community 
organization. When the full sample is compared to Head Start, the reported rate among low­
income Americans is higher ( 1 7. 1  percent for Head Start to 1 6.3 for the full sample). This helps 
confirm the claim that Head Start bolsters participation rates among its users. 
Regression Analysis 
Figure 1 shows the total number of respondents who received each of the three public 
assistance programs versus the full sample. Figure 1 also creates predictions about whether or 
not a respondent would participate politically or civically. While it is nearly impossible to say 
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of public assistance received, it is  possible to look for evidence that would suggest they do. This 
is what the logistic regression is designed to do. A finding of significance for any of the public 
assistance programs or hardship variables included in the analysis would suggest that the type of 
program and the appearance or lack of hardships a respondent has helps determine their 
likelihood to participate politically or civically. The inclusion of controls wil l  only strengthen the 
finding by removing the possibility that the significance could be attributed to unmeasured 
factors. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, the preferred method of analysis is 
Lo git. This type of regression is designed for dichotomous variables and provides the best 
vehicle for testing. The drawback of this type of test is that the results are more difficult to 
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interpret. Because of this, I have included the results as odds ratios for ease of interpretation. The 
following analysis will focus on the regression. 
In Table 1 ,  the Logit analysis is split into three separate models. Model 1 performs with 
some very interesting results. Each group of policies and hardships will be treated separately for 
individual analysis.  Taken alone, these results should be used with some caution. Because many 
of the responses to political and civic participation are going to be predicted by many factors, 
one cannot definitively say that public assistance policies and hardships determined political and 
civic participation. The real test is to see whether the levels of significance can be maintained 
despite the inclusion of controls. 
Examining the three public assistance programs, Model 1 performs as expected. The 
analysis shows that both TANF and public housing assistance have a negative impact on voting 
likelihood. With T ANF, the likelihood of a respondent voting is decreased by 54.9 percent and 
with Public Housing, the odds of the respondent voting is decreased by 7.5 percent. Consistent 
with previous research, Head Start recipients have a positive likelihood of voting by 1 8 .2 
percent. However this positive likelihood of voting was not significant. Though Head Start was 
not significant, its positive odds of voting coupled with the significance of TANF and Public 
Housing likelihood adds support to hypotheses one and two. However, an analysis of the 
political and civic participation variables will be needed to conclusively confirm the two 
hypotheses. 
Economic hardships proved to be highly consistent with the third hypothesis. Examining 
the results show that for all five variables, each was highly significant. The first variable 
indicating whether a respondent had a secure place to live indicates a positive likelihood of 
voting. Since the variable was coded as to show whether the respondent did have a secure place 
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to live, we can see that if a respondent replied yes to the question of having a place to live there 
was a 30 .2% greater likelihood of them voting. The second variable measuring whether or not 
the respondent had a means to provide emergency childcare also showed positive odds of voting 
by 40.5 percent. This variable too was coded as to indicate an affirmative answer to the question 
of having the means to provide emergency childcare, thus the results are expected. Having a job 
was also significant in model one. For the fourth variable measuring whether the respondent had 
a vehicle or not, we can see that there were positive odds of them voting by 6.3 percent. The final 
economic hardship measures whether or not the respondent has a conviction record and shows a 
lower likelihood of voting by 5 .7 percent. Each of these variables' odds ratios and significance 
level provide support to hypothesis three. 
The three public assistance programs for model two perform as expected. The analysis 
shows that both T ANF and public housing assistance have a negative impact on participating 
politically likelihood: T ANF at 32 percent and Public Housing at 5.4 percent. Head Start 
recipients also have a positive likelihood of participating politically by 8.9 percent. However this 
positive likelihood of voting was not significant. Though Head Start was not significant, its 
positive odds of voting coupled with the significance of TANF and Public Housing likelihood 
adds support to hypotheses one and two. 
The three public assistance programs for model three perform as expected. The analysis 
shows that both T ANF and public housing assistance have a negative impact on civic 
participation likelihood: TANF at 1 2 .3 percent and Public Housing at 9.8 percent. Head Start 
recipients also have a positive likelihood of participating civically by 73.7 percent. This high 
positive likelihood of participating civically was very significant. The positive odds ratios and 
significance levels for model three add support to hypotheses one and two. 
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Economic hardships proved to be consistent with the third hypothesis. Examining the 
results shows that all ,  but one was significant. The first variable indicating whether a respondent 
had a secure place to live indicates a positive likelihood of participating civically of 25 .8  percent. 
The second variable measuring whether or not the respondent had a means to provide emergency 
childcare also showed positive odds of participating civically at 29.5 percent. Having a job 
showed a positive odds ratio of 6 percent. For the fourth variable measuring whether the 
respondent had a vehicle or not, we can see that there were positive odds of them participating 
civically by 4.9 percent. The final economic hardship was non-significant and shows a lower 
likelihood of participating civically by 0.4 percent. Since most of these variables' were 
significant, hypothesis three gains some support. 
Examining the four demographic and control variables, it can be seen that the 
respondent' s parents' educational background have positive odds ratios, indicating a greater 
likelihood to vote. However, the respondent's parents' educational background was not a 
significant predictor of a greater likelihood to vote. This was somewhat surprising as previous 
research suggests that educational background increases the likelihood to vote. However, since 
the variable measured the parents' educational background and not the respondent educational 
background, the results might be more fitting to the conclusion that educational background of 
respondent' s parents might not influence the likelihood to vote. The third demographic and 
control variable measured whether the respondent is married. This variable had a positive odds 
ratio .  This variable was also highly significant indicating it was a good predictor of the 
independent variables. The fourth and final demographic and control variable measured whether 
or not the respondent was in poverty. This variable' s odds ratio was negative and indicated a 
decrease in the likelihood of to vote and participate politically and civically. 
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Table 1 .  Odds Ratios of All Outcomes 
Predictors Model I :  Voting Model 2: Political Participation Model 3 :  Civic Participation 
Respondent's Mother Graduated College 1 .046 (.027) 1 .0 1 0  ( .046) 1 .045 (.030) 
Respondent's Father Graduated College 1 .040 ( .029) 1 .0 1 8  ( .04 7) 1 .054 ( .03 1 )  
Respondent is Married 1 .075*** ( .0 1 2) .992***  (.02 1 )  1 .054*** ( .0 1 5) 
Respondent is in Poverty .369 *** (.093) .2 1 8 * * *  ( . 1 73)  .405*** ( . 1 02) 
TANF .55 1 ***  ( .088) .680** ( . 1 80) . 877 ( . 1 1 8)  
Public Housing .925*** ( .01 7) .946**  ( .024) .902*** ( .0 1 9) 
Head Start 1 . 1 82 ( . 129) 1 .089 ( .2 1 8) 1 .737*** ( . 1 5 1 )  
Secure Place to Live 1 .302*** (.078) 1 .070 ( . 1 33)  1 .258* ( . 1 13 )  
Means t o  Provide Emergency Child Care 1 .405*** ( .086) 1 .044 ( . 1 6 1 )  1 .295* ( . 1 29) 
Respondent Has a Job 1 .063*** ( . 1 54) 1 .0 5 1  ** (.022) 1 . 060*** ( .0 1 5) 
Respondent Owns a Vehicle 1 .059*** (.0 1 7) 1 .025 ( .020) 1 .049** ( .0 1 5) 
Conviction Record .943 *** (.020) .939 ( .032) .996 (.026) 
Partner Has Drug or Alcohol Problem .997 (.040) .989 ( .070) .892 (.06 1 )  
Relationship Status 1 . 1 77 (. 144) 1 .037 ( .053) 1 .0 1 1  ( .040) 
Respondent Reported Abuse .993 (.032) .995 ( .023) .953** ( .0 1 7) 
Partner Has Condition that Limits Work .959 (.040) .959 ( .040) .502** ( . 1 1 7) 
Mother' s  Health .7 1 4*** ( . 1 1 0) .92 1 * *  ( .034) .798 ( . 1 48) 
Mother Has Condition that Limits Work .980 ( . 1 37) .996 (.263) .727** (.080) 
Mother Takes Medication for Condition .99 1 ( .023) .92 1 ** (.034) .956 (.029) 
Mother Reports Being Depressed . 926 (.072) . 720 ( . 1 46) .964 ( .076) 
Mother Has History of Drug Abuse .958 ( . 147) . 1 26***  ( .2 1 1 )  .960 ( . 1 82) 
Child Has Medical Condition .868** ( .046) .896 ( . 1 06) .987 (.057) 
LR Chi2 (df) 1 76 . 107*** (22) 5 1 .8 7 1  *** (22) 1 1 3 .70 1 *** (22) 
Note: N = 303 1 .  Values represent odd ratios for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are in Parentheses. Data from 
Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study. * p < .05 ;  * *  p < .0 1 ;  ***  p < .001 (two-tailed tests). 
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This variable was also highly significant across all models and lends greater credence to the idea 
that those in poverty on much less likely to vote and participate politically and civically. 
Personal hardships indicated much less expected results. Each of the personal hardship 
variables was not significant. Three of the personal hardships indicated a negative likelihood to 
vote (i .e. Partner reports drug or alcohol problem at 0.3 percent less likelihood to vote, 
respondent reports abuse at 0. 7 percent, and partner has a condition that limits work ability at 4. 1 
percent) and one variable has a positive likelihood to vote (i.e. relationship status at 1 7 .7  
percent). Since the variables were not significant, the results are against hypothesis four. 
The final group of variables measures health related hardships. Only two variables from 
this category were significant. These variables (mother' s health at 29.6 percent decreased 
likelihood to vote and child has a medical condition at 1 3 .2 percent decreased likelihood to vote) 
are directly related to the respondent's ability to get out and vote, so their significance was 
expected. However, the other variables being non-significant were a surprise. It was 
hypothesized that most of these variables would be significant. Although they all show a 
decreased likelihood to vote, the results for model one on health hardships help disconfirm 
hypothesis five. 
The final group of variables measuring health related hardships shows three variables 
from this category were significant. These variables (mother's health at 7.9 percent decreased 
likelihood of participating politically, child has a medical condition at 7 .9 percent decreased 
likelihood of participating politically, and mother' s history of drug abuse at 87.4 percent 
decreased likelihood of participating politically) were expected to be significant. It was 
hypothesized that most of these variables would be significant. Since they all show a decreased 
likelihood of participating politically and three are significant, the results for model two on 
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health hardships help confirm hypothesis five. 
Personal hardships also show some expected results. Two of the personal hardship 
variables were significant. Three of the personal hardships indicated a negative likelihood to 
participating civically (i.e. Partner reports drug or alcohol problem at 1 0 .8  percent less likelihood 
to vote, respondent reports abuse at 4. 7 percent, and partner has a condition that limits work 
ability at 49.8 percent) and two variables have a positive likelihood to participating civically (i .e. 
relationship status at 1 . 1  percent). Since half of the variables were significant, the results are 
mixed for hypothesis four. 
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Chapter 7 :  Conclusion 
The failure of personal and health related hardships to remain significant (Hyp. 4 and 5) 
in the Lo git regression was counter to expectations. Had all the hardships remained significant, it 
would have allowed a broader claim that hardships influence one's ability to participate 
politically and civically. Models one and three for economic hardships being only partially 
confirmed (Hyp. 3) was also unexpected. The results for hypothesis three show that even though 
one may not have the means to vote or participate, it does not mean they will not. All of the 
variables in models one through three show the expected sign, which supports the hypotheses. 
The lack of significance in some of the models weakens some of the hypotheses to an extent. 
However, it does not refute the hypotheses completely. The public policies findings confirm 
hypotheses one and two. These findings reinforce Bruch et al. (201 0) and others' work by 
showing that the public policies and their policy designs influence political and civic 
participation. 
One fault of this study is the restricted age range of the Fragile Families sample, which 
measures young parents of very young children. Given this we cannot generalize the results to 
older adults. It is important to ask, do policies affect older adults differently than younger adults? 
For example, do we see more feedback effects when individuals experience policies during their 
younger, impressionable years? This question and others need to be answered and are important 
for explaining political behavior over the course of life. 
Political participation of low-income Americans, particularly those afflicted with serious 
economic, personal, or health related hardships, is an important topic for political scientists. 
Though Policy Feedback Theory can help explain much of how and why populations affected by 
policies engage politically and civically, it is important to consider other factors that can increase 
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and decrease political participation. This study lends some support to the idea that hardships 
influence the likelihood of low-income Americans participating politically and civically. In some 
cases, hardships can lower participation rates, while public assistance policies with paternalistic 
and bureaucratic designs significantly lower participation rates. Politicians and policy experts 
can take note of these results and give greater attention to these problems as to alleviate this low 
rate of participation in American political and civic life. 
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